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The third formal check occurs just prior to 
the administration of the oath of enlistment. 
The enlisting officer explains to. the applicants 
the general meaning of Article 83, Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §883 
(1970)) and the provisions for adverse adminis-
trative discharge for fraudulent enlistment. 
The applicants are then afforded an opportu-
nity to discuss any withheld or falsified infor-
mation with the briefer, and they are again 
asked if anyone instructed them to withhold or 
falsify information. Paragraph 6-7, AR 601-
270/AFR 33-7/0PNAVINST 1100.4/MCO 
P1100.75. 
The inauguration of the United States Mili-
tary Enlistment Processing Command removed 
from the control of the recruiting services, the 
machinery for testing the mental ability and 
the medical condition of applicants for enlist-
ment. Moreover,· the p-roc-edures· used in the'& 
AFEES have ·severed the nexus bet~~_en_~ih.~~ 
d_ishonesf rf£:f!!!t~LJrid the unqualified appli-. 
c·ant~, The applicant who raises his/her right 
hand, mouths the oath of enlistment, and signs 
the enlistment document (Department of De-
4 
fense Form 4), has made his/her own decision. 
He/she knows what must be revealed and the 
consequences of not revealing the information, 
and he/she knows that the enlistment agree-
ment is limited to the language on the signed 
documents. If an improper enlistment 
nevertheless occurs with the assistance of a re-
cruiter, one might hope that the United States 
Court of Military Appeals would reconsider its 
opinion in United States v. Russo6 in the light 
of the quality control measures adopted since 
that decision. The Court might view public 
policy as requiring punishment of both the re-
cruiter and the enlistee for his/her own delicts. 
Footnotes 
1 United States v. Russo, 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975). 
2/d. at 137. 
3 United States v. Little, 1 M.J. 476 (C.M.A. 1976). 
4 /rJ,. at 478. 
5 Department of the Army General Order Number 7, 26 
April 1976, and Department of the Army Regulation 
Number 10-52, 28 February 1977. 
6 1 M.J. 134 (C.M.A. 1975). 
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Introduction 
Enlistments continue to generate judicial and 
administrative interest. Over the past few 
years the topic has been raised in a variety of 
forums and forms; in some instances the law of 
enlistments has been refined and questions an-
swered. But in other areas, the law remains 
unsettled, open to continued spec~ulation, and 
subject to a variety of interpretations. One 
area where enlistment law has received keen 
scrutiny is the subject of enlistment contracts 
vis a vis the question of personal jurisdiction. 
A recent trio of Court of Military Appeals 
decisions, United States v. Wagner,! United 
States v. Valadez, 2 and United States v. Har-
rison, 3 sheds some dispositive light on that 
issue. This article will examine these three 
cases and their potential impact on the law of 
enlistments. The first section reviews the three 
decisions and the remaining sections deal with 
some of the recurring issues raised in enlist-
ment law and addressed by the Court in this 
most recent trilogy. 
The Decisions 
We turn our attention first to the Court's de-
cision in United States v. Wagner, which 
served in several respects as t~e keystone for 
the Valadez and Harrison decisions. Gregory 
Wagner was arrested in Michigan in 1974 for 
carrying a concealed weapon in the trunk of his 
car. After being arraigned and during a meet-
ing with his mother and appointed attorney, 
Wagner learned that the charge might be 
dropped if he were to join the Army. 4 Wagner 
subsequently met with Sergeant Olds, a re-
cruiter in Coldwater, Michigan, and took the 
initial preenlistment mental examination before 
disclosing to the recruiter that he had a charge 
pending against him. Sergeant Olds told 
Wagner that he would have to suspend proc-
essing the enlistment application until "the 
court took proper disposition of the case."5 
Several weeks later Sergeant Olds was told by 
the prosecuting attorney that an "Order Nolle 
Prosequi" had been entered in Wagner's case. 
Shortly thereafter Wagner joined the Army. 
The Army Court of Military Review viewed 
Wagner's enlistment as void but ruled that 
jurisdiction existed because of a valid construc-
tive enlistment. 6 
The Court of Military Appeals noted that 
three separate questions were raised: First, 
§}lou,l£1 Wagner's enlistment contract b.eJ!On.§i.tl:: 
e.!'.~!!,yoJ(\~~~j~~WltlJ;g0<a purported lack pf 
voluntariness?· :second was there sufficient re-«--,~~"-~-- .,,_' "'"~""-""'"'c:i'"-""'.~2-~ ' "'-""'" - _ · · '·. - .::. --~c -~,,.~,--.,.,_.,,,,.,__~,_,"""'""' --"-~-·M-"""-''~-dV-
crul.termisconduct in the case to void "from the 
·b~-gi~~Itig'; "th~-en!i~tment"£~r.tti~~tfi"andiilkd'r 
<H9. the 9i~qualification by a nomv;~Jy~J~ .§~r,y:­
ice regulation constitute "an inherent vice" so. 
><_;"' '• , •'•"•'-•-•"•••,·'-··•>''.o~--·::C>.~··-·,,<>1\<ht."'-~~J'.JJ',.,,. ,l--~-~~;,1' 
~!i<LJli~ble Wagner from acquinng military 
&taty.s as a matter of enlistment contract law 
principles? 7 
Turning first to the issue of "voluntariness," 
the Court relied upon its earlier decision in . 
United States v. Lightfoot, 8 and distinguished 
Wagner's entry from that in United States v. 
Catlow. 9 Here, as in Lightfoot, Wagner had en-
tered the service upon advice of counsel and not 
because of intimidation, improper influence, or 
the "carrot and stick" method found inCatlow. 
Wagner's enlistment was therefore "volun-
tary.''lO 
The second issue caused little concern. The 
Court stated: 
We find no deliberate violation of re· 
cruiting regulations to allow the enlistment 
of an ineligible applicant in the present 
case, nor any negligenc~ on the part of the 
recruiter sufficient to justify voiding the 
appellant's original enlistment contract. 
Accordingly, there was no recruiter mis~ 
5 
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conduct within the meaning of the United 
States v. Russo ... which would require us 
on this ground to dismiss the charges 
11 
The third issue received greater attention. 
Wagner had enlisted in violation of a nonwaiva-
ble regulatory disqualification which prohibited 
individuals from enlisting if criminal or juvenile 
charges had been filed by civil authorities or 
were still pending. 12 The "precise legal ques-
tion," according to Judge Fletcher, was 
"whether this regulatory disqualification in and 
of itself voids the original enlistment contract 
for purposes of court-martial jurisdiction."13 
Turning to the Supreme Court's decision in In 
re Grimley, 14 the Court noted first that the Su-
preme Court had placed emphasis on the fact 
that Grimley had failed to disclose his disqual-
ification to the recruiter prior to his enlistment. 
Secondly, the Court was "particularly struck 
by the public policy considerations articulated 
in 1890, which retain their viability in our mind 
with respect to our present day military situa-
tion."15 Finally, the Court stated that the reg-
ulation in question was constructued for the 
be~efit of boththe government and recruit but 
aga:lll cited Grimley as support for the proposi-
tion that undisclosed violation of the Army re-
cruiting regulations, in and of itself, was not 
sufficient to void Wagner's enlistment con-
tract.16 
In addition, the Court made, inter alia, the 
following points: 
a. There is no statutory prohibition against 
enlistment by a person, who through coun-
sel, initiates a proposal of military service 
as an. alternative to further prosecution for 
a civilian criminal offense. 17 
b. The recruiting regulation in question, 
unlike insanity, idiocy, or infancy, does not 
render the contracting party non sui juris 
so as to prevent the recruit from changing 
his status through enlistment contract. 18 
c. Where a mere regulatory disqualifica-
tion exists, the enlistment contract re-
mains "voidable," absent action by the re-
cruit to void the contact, prior to the com-
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mission of an offense. As such, it is a 
proper basis for court-martial jurisdic-
tion.19 
Recruiting regulations and recruiter conduct 
again appeared as key issues in United States 
v. Valadez. 20 Valadez had erringly entered 
service in the Navy due to an oversight on the 
part of a recruiter who failed to note that Val-
adez's age and failure to graduate from high 
school, cojoined with a low entrance test score, 
disqualified him. 21 The Court cited Wagner, 
supra, and again noted that although a regula-
tory violation may provide the recruit with 
standing to void his enlistment contract, the 
enlistment remains voidable. 22 Here Valadez's 
enlistment was not void merely because it vio-
lated a particular service regulation. Remain-
ing was the issue of whether the recruiter's 
negligence in this case voided the enlistment 
contract. No, said the Court, citing its decision 




While ,~!;~Q~\!tt,r~j~~c~et;l. t!!,~JP.!V~! ~£Q.Yrt' s 
application of gon!!!t.p!SRXf!:.~~-It!i§t~t,§jnJ~g!h..,,., 
W~Yrt:t':lz:, .. anq.f,~l~£~z.it approved application of 
that doctrine in United States v. Harrison. 25 
Harrison had enlisted while sixteen years of 
age, but after reaching seventeen received pay 
and benefits and indicated to his commanding 
officer an intent to perform his assigned 
duties-evidence, said the Court, which could 
be "construed as an offer on his part, when 
conditionally capable, to enlist or to mislead the 
Navy into accepting him as a regular serv-
icemember. "26 
The question raised in Harrison was 
whether the recruiter had been negligent in not 
discovering that Harrison was a minor and, 
therefore, ineligible. When Harrison could not 
produce a birth certificate the recruiter unsuc-
cessfully checked with the state's bureau of 
vital statistics. As an alternative, the recruiter 
checked with what Harrison claimed to be a 
family Bible which only confrrmed Harrison's 
lie. 27 A telephonic check with a woman iden-
tifying herself as Harrison's grandmother also 
failed to disclose the sham. Satisfied that the 
recruit was eighteen, the recruiter completed 
the. necessary paperwork. 
Using its decision in United States v. 
Brown 28 as a template, the Court did not con-
sider the recruiter's action "unfair": 
It is true, however, that the recruiter 
was negligent to the extent that he failed 
to recognize the apparent age ineligibility 
from the appellant's record of juvenile in-
volvement. We hesitate, however, to 
equate such apparent inadvertent mistake 
by this recruiter with the failure to per-
form affirmative recruiting practices de-
signed by regulation to prevent such en-
listments, so apparent in the Brown case. 29 
The Government was, therefore, not estopped 
to argue constructive enlistment as a basis for 
court-martial jurisdiction over Harrison. 
In effect, this recent trio of cases tracks in 
many respects with another trio of enlistment 
cases-Catlow (voluntariness), Russo (regula-
tions), and Brown (constructive enlistment). 
The trios differ in one main respect. In this 
latest round of decisions the individual was 
considered amenable to court-martial jurisdic-
tion. Several oft-confronted themes run 
throughout all these cases and provide further 
clarification of the present Court's posture on 
elistment contracts. In the following sections, 
we will briefly examine those themes. 
The Enlistment: Voluntary Execution of a 
Contract 
In these three cases, the Court evidenced a 
continued reliance on principles of contract 
law. 30 One of the core elements in any contract, 
of course, is voluntariness. In Wagner, the 
court emphasized that the recruit was sui juris 
and had not been coerced into joining the 
Army. 31 Whatever other defects may have 
existed in Wagner's enlistment, Wagner could 
not claim that he was incapable of contracting 
with the Government. The court did not spe-
cifically delineate what statutory or regulatory 
provisions would render the recruit ineligible, 
but the thrust of the opinion on this point was 
that Wagner possessed the legal capacity to 
contract.82 However, if the qualifying statute 
-or regulation goes to the very power, or ability 
to contract (insanity, minority) then the en-
listment contract may be invalid even if the 
Government can show voluntariness. 33 
The fact that the Court is relying on federal 
contract law is itself instructive and marks 
another instance in an overall shift from the po-
sition taken by this Court's precedessors, that 
the enlistment is primarily a change in status. 34 
In so relying, the Court is swinging into a pos-
ture more in line with the civilian judicial 
treatment of the enlistment process-at least 
on the question of valid formation of an enlist-
ment contract. 35 
Recruiting Regulations 
The recurring problem of what impact, if 
any, recruiting regulation qualifications have 
on enlistments was raised both in Wagner and 
Valadez. You will recall that the regulatory 
disqualification in Wagner involved the "join-
the-Army-or-go-to-jail" disqualification. In 
Valadez, the regulatory provisions on mental 
proficiency of the recruit were questioned. J:n 
both insfances"l]ie"colirfstated that the viola-
tio~- ~£ ~~~crnit'in~i·t-egui;tr~;;~iJ~(f~:fit~~If,' 
would cnorvoia"'Hie-eriHstment. The enlistment 
w~:~11id i11st~ad be .. y:oT~T,-~.~- -'"··-·· ···· ···· ·· · __ ,~ 
In so holding, the Court emphasized that it 
had never held that an undisclosed violation of 
a recruiting regulation would void an enlist-
ment. 37 Wl!~tE;LY~t: th~.£2Yt~ ffi.i:l:Y~P-'~~.2!~,?, 
its earlier decision§ seeJ]1,E;)JLto c}~arly predict a 
rule inextricably binding the Governml:!nt_~Q 
follow _its recruiting regulatiog§_:jail.lJLEL.!q.J2k 
low the_rg~ruiti:ng regulatiop!:;_WC)J~1g~J!L~ 
void e:qli_s._tment. 38 The Court's refinement of 
the role of recruiting regulations is welcomed 
and the adoption of a rule which treats a reg-
ulatorily deficient enlistment as "voidable" falls 
more in line with prevailing contract law prin-
ciples. 
The disqualified recruit is still able to take 
advantage of the regulatory disqualification 
prior to, but not after, an offense has been 
committed. This last point raises some ques-
tions, however. In Wagner, the Court noted 
7 
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that "absent action by the recruit to void an 
enlistment suffering from mere regulatory dis-
qualification, and prior to the commission of the 
offense, his enlistment contract remains merely 
voidable and is a proper basis for court-martial 
jurisdiction. " 39 But in Va.ladez, the Court 
opined (when speaking of a regulatory viola-
tion) that the enlistment contract remains void-
able "until the recruit takes action to void the 
contract, prior to his commission of an offense 
and action taken by the Government with a 
view towards trial. "40 The latter quote appears 
inconsistent with the first. According to the 
language in Wagner, the recruit's right to 
avoid the enlistment is clearly cut off at the 
commission of an offense. The language in Val-
adez indicates that the commission of the of-
fense and "action by the Government with a 
view towards trial" are the cut-off points. The 
two events do not necessarily, or normally, 
take effect on the same date. Which rule 
applies? The cases cited by the court to support 
both quoted rules, Morrissey v. Perry 41 and 
United States v. Beans, 42 dealt respectively 
with situations where the enlistees questioned 
their status before and after charges had been 
preferred. The Supreme Court's opinion in 
Morrissey, supra, and the public policy consid-
erations so heavily relied upon in Wagner 
would demand that the recruit may not void the 
contract after an offense has been committed.43 
To allow the recruit to void his contract after 
the offense but before the Government acts, 
would give the recruit an effective "get-out-
of-jail-free" ticket. 
In summary, although the ultimate impact on 
the court's position on regulatory deficiencies 
in the enlistment contract is yet to be seen, 
several conclusions can be drawn. First, regu-
latory deficiencies in the enlistment will not 
necessarily void the enlistment. The Court has 
noted: 
It is only when the recruiting regulation 
also amounts in fact and law to either a 
hick of vohmtariness, a statutory incapac-
ity to contract, or a disability embraced 
within the enlistment contract principles 
intimated by the Supreme Court in Grim-
ley . . . will such a disqualification be found 
__________________ "-r' __ _,__,... _______________________ .....,.Jl",'iJ:JO.{;?,W!4<h;¥:;·>?o"i 
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sufficient to void the enlistment contract 
ab initio as a basis for court-martial juris-
diction. 44 
Second, the Court, perhaps in a shift of phi-
losophy or analysis, is allowing the Government 
a little breathing room in applying the myriad 
of technical recruiting regulations, at least in 
those cases where the defect is not disclosed. 
Third, the recruit's right to invalidate the 
enlistment must be timely. Commission of an 
offense cuts off his standing and presents the 
Government with the option of exercising 
court-martial jurisdiction; an option many felt 
was abrogated after Russo. 
Recruiter Conduct 
Another common thread in the three cases is 
the action, or inaction, of the recruiters. The 
decisions on this point reveal no new or start~ 
ling revelations but do offer soille refmement of 
e~isting principles. · -
The recruiter conduct issue usually arises in 
one of two settings: in determining whether an 
enlistment is void ab initio under Russo 45 
and/or in determining whether the Government 
is later estopped from arguing the existence of 
a constructive enlistment. 46 Both settings were 
present in this latest trio of decisions. In 
Wagner, the Court questioned the recruiter's 
conduct and found no deliberate violation of re-
cruiting regulations nor any negligence on his 
part. In Valadez, the recruiter's simple negli-
gence in not discovering a regulatory disqual-
ification did not void the enlistment. And in 
Harrison, the Government was not estopped 
from showing a constructive enlistment be-
cause the recruiter had not acted unfairly. 
In each case, the court further defined and 
refined its prior holdings in Catlow, Brown, 
and Russo. Several points may be gleaned from 
the Court's language. First, where a recruiter's 
actions in completing the enlistment process 
are in question, misconduct approaching that 
found in Russo-intentional violation of Article 
84-must normally be present before the en-
listment will be voided ab initio on the ground 
of recruiter misconduct. Enlistments resulting 
8 
from mere recruiter negligence or good faith 
actions, according to the court, are not nor-
mally considered void because of public policy. 
In reaching that decision, the Court stated that 
such enlistments are not in the best interests of 
the public, the military, or the recruit, but 
"delicate" public policy considerations must be 
valued: 
Moreover, we can hardly classify simple 
negligence as a natural wrong in the man-
ner of establishment of an enlistment con-
tract, or conduct on the level of compul-
sion, solicitation or misrepresentation con-
demned by implication in G1'imley. Finally, 
we believe that the interest of the primary 
society in the effective and disciplined 
fighting force significantly outweighs any 
possible concern on its part with an enlist-
ment of an ineligible recruit inadvertently 
caused by simple negligence. 47 · 
But, the court also stated that actions 
amounting to something less than intentional 
misconduct and something more than mere 
negligence might nonetheless void an 
enlistment: 
Moreover, it is conceivable that negli-
gence of a higher degree, e.g. wanton and 
willful, which is employed to avoid discov-
ering recruiting disqualifications, coupled 
with the existence of such a regulatory dis-
qualification, may be sufficient recruiter 
misconduct to justify declaring an enlist-
ment contract so procured void ab initio 
for purposes of court-martial jurisdiction. 48 
A troubling facet of the recruiter conduct is-
sues is the reliance placed by the Court on "un-
knowing" actions by the recruiter. In Wagner 
especially, the Court spoke in terms of undis-
closed regulatory disqualifications. 49 However, 
in examining the thrust of the opinion, one can 
see that a recruiter might very well be aware of 
the deficiency~ but inadvertently misread or 
misapply the appropriate regulatory provision, 
as in Valadez. Whether the Court assesses the 
recruiter's conduct as intentional, grossly neg-
ligent or merely negligent will determine 
whether the enlistment is valid. Reading 
Wagner and Valadez together we see that the 
mere fact that a deficiency is "disclosed" does 
not always render the enlistment void ab in-
itio. More is required. 50 
The degree of recruiter, or Government, 
misconduct necessary to estop argument of 
constructive enlistments is another matter. 
Apparently, less is required. In constructive 
enlistment situations, the Government is es-
topped if the actions of the recruiter, or the 
Government, are not "fair." What is "fair"? The 
court noted the amorphous nature of the term 
in Harrison51 and rather than present detailed 
guidelines, the court instead relied on Brown, 
supra, to "elicit the boundaries" of the princi-
ple of estoppel. 52 
Thus~ it seems that if recruiter misconduct, 
at the time of enlistment, amounts to an inten-
tional violation of Article 84, UCMJ, the en-
listment is void ab initio and the Government 
is also estopped from later showing a construc-
tive enlistment. If the enlistment is void ab in-
itio, for some reason other than recruiter mis-
conduct, subsequent "unfair" or "unreasonable" 
actions on the part of the Governn mnment 
3 may prevent the GGovernment from relying 
on the concept of conntructive enlistment. 
Constructive Enlistment 
In Wagner and Valadez, the Courts of Mili-
tary Review had rested court-martial jurisdic-
tion on constructive enlistments. Because the 
Court of Military Appeals found no evidence 
that the original disqualifying features were 
ever cured, it rejected application of that con-
cept and instead turned its attention, as dis-
cussed in preceding sections, to the question of 
whether the enlistments in question were ever 
void ab initio. 
In Harrison, the Court directly confronted 
the issue antated that it was satisfied with the 
lawfulness of the doctrine of construcive en-
listment. 54 But, the Court added. that its deci-
sion should not be "misconstttrued to sanction 
the carte blanche determinations by the lower 
courts of the constructe enlistments."55 
While recognizin the validity of the concept, 
the Court nonetheless continued to restrict its 
9 
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application to situations where the Government 
has acted fairly. The conduct of the Govern-
ment in Harrison was not unreasonable; the 
"apparent inadvertent mistake by the re-
cruiter'' did not amount to a failure to perform 
affirmative recruiting practices as was the case 
in Brown. 56 For the moment, the lower courts 
are tasked with determining on a case by case 
basis whether the actions or inactions of the re-
cruiter were "unreasonable" or "unfair." 
The Harrison case does little to remedy any 
of the uneasiness resting on the constructive 
enlistment question. The Court, instead of 
drawing some definitive guidelines, simply 
cited Brown as a pattern for the lower court's 
use in those cases in which improper recruiting 
practices are involved. The root of the problem 
in applying· the concept of constructive enlist-
ment to any given fact pattern is that the "fair-
ness" requirement looks good on paper but 
poses numerous practical problems. The ques-
tion often is reduced to whom the Court be-
lieves. If the Court believes that the Govern-
ment has been consistently legitimate in its 
attempt to establish the military status of an ac-
cused, then personal jurisdiction will vest. One 
means of alleviating the troublesome concept of 
fairness which, as the Court recognized, "may 
give rise to misuse of the doctrine of construc-
tive enlistment either in favor of the Govern-
ment or the accused,"57 is to create a statutory 
constructive enlistment in those cases where 
the individual has committed an offense. 58 
One point raised in both Wagner and Val-
adez should be addressed. In rejecting the need 
to apply the constructive enlistment concept in 
those cases, the court stated that there was no 
showing by the Government that the disqual-
ifying conditions had ceased to exist. 59 That 
may have been the case in Valadez 60 but not in 
Wagner. The Court in Wagner cited Cat low for 
the continuing disability ·proposition. But in 
Catlow, the Court had stated that Catlow 
might have perfected a constructive enlistment 
if he had subsequently served voluntarily. 61 
Assuming, as the Army Court of Military Re-
view did, that Wagner's enlistment was void, 
then a valid constructive enlistment could ripen 
because, as the Court itself acknowledged in 
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Wagner, there was voluntary service by a 
party not suffering from "insanity, idiocy, or 
infancy."62 The disability had dissapated. 63 
Public Policy 
Although mentioned briefly in Russo, the 
court deals at some length in these three deci-
sions with the concept of public policy. There 
are repeated references to the Supreme Court's 
reliance in Grimley on public policy consid-
erations. With ever so subtle shifts in its read-
ing of the delicate "public policy" or fairness, 
the court is free to validate or void any enlist-
ment or constructive enlistment before it. In 
this triology it has chosen to validate the en-
listments, and, therefore, the military status of 
the individuals. 
In Wagner, the Court examined the recruit-
ing regulation prohibiting enlistment of some-
one pending criminal charges and stated: 
[P]ublic policy considerations inherent in 
the maintenance of a disciplined and effec-
tive military to protect society at large dic-
tate against construing such a regulatory 
disqualification as inherent in the sub-
stance of the contract and requiring au-
tomatic voiding of the enlistment contract 
without some action of the appellant prior 
to the commission of the offense. 64 
In Valadez the interest of the primary soci-
ety in a disciplined fighting force outweighed 
any possible concern with an enlistment caused 
by inadvertent recruiter actions. 65 And in 
Harrison the Government was not estopped 
from showing a constructive enlistment be-
cause it had acted fairly. 
In short, the Court applied, whether in-
tended or not, a balancing test: it considered 
the individual's constitutional protections and 
the "constitutional interest in the protection of 
the primary society by an effective and disci-
plined fighting force."6 6 
Conclusion 
' As noted at the outset, this most recent 
series of enlistment decisions provides some 
answers and solutions to enlistment contract 
10 
questions. However, the decisions also raise 
new issues 67 while at the same time leaving 
others yet untouched. 68 
Counsel faced with issues similar to those 
raised in Wagner, Valadez, and Harrison will 
find guidance in those decision and may expect 
to raise, among others, the following issues and 
questions: 
1. Does the disqualification in question go to 
the recruit's ability to contract (e.g. insanity, 
intoxication, minority)? See Wagner. 
2. If so, the contract is probably void. If not, 
was the disqualification (statutory or regula-
tory) disclosed to the recruiter or other Gov-
ernment representative? If not, see Wagner. If 
so, counsel should be prepared to litigate 
whether subsequent recruiter or Government 
actions were intentional (violations of Article 
84, UCMJ), wanton, willful, or merely negli-
gent.69 See Valadez. 
3. If the disqualification was not disclosed 
and no recruiter misconduct was involved, did 
the recruit take any action to void his enlist-
ment prior to committing an offense? See 
Wagner and Valadez. 
4. Was the enlistment voluntarily entered? 
5. If contract is void for some reason other 
than Government misconduct, was a construc-
tive enlistment formed? If so, does fairness 
prevent the Government from asserting it? See 
Harrison. 
In all situations counsel should be familiar 
with all three cases and prepared to argue the 
competing interests (i.e. balancing test) and 
public policy considerations. Both facets were 
continuing threads through and around the 
three decisions. 
This most recent trio provides further 
catalyst for future enlistment decisions and 
administrative rulings. 70 It will no doubt con-
tinue to stir the varied interpretations and de-
bates that surround the present Court of Mili-
tary Appeals. 
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take place in routine situations does not comport 
with reason or experience. The measure of proof of 
a negative fact which can be mustered and the ex-
penditure of effort in money and manpower places 
a particularly onerous burden orr the Government 
once an issue has been raised by a bald but detailed 
assertion of an accused seeking to avoid criminal 
penalities. 4 M.J. at 530. 
70 1t is no secret that the Court's decisions in Russo, 
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a series of onerous and ill-conceived rules. Indeed, 
even the Comptroller General has indicated that a mili-
tary court's determination that it does not have juris-
diction over an individual does not automatically void 
the enlistment for purposes of terminating the indi-
vidual's entitlement to pay and allowances. See 57 
Comp. Gen. 132 (1977). 
Reductions for Inefficiency: An Overlooked Tool 
Major Gregory 0. Varo, Administrative Law Division, OT JAG 
As enlisted members move up through the 
ranks, most do so with dedication. They know 
their abilities; they have confidence in their po-
tential; they are proud of their stripes. Too 
often, however, the value of those stripes and 
the morale of a unit are diminished because of a 
command failure to act swiftly to reduce mem-
bers who demonstrate their unworthiness for 
the grade they hold. 
There is a tendency to thin'k of inefficiency in 
terms of incompetence on the job-the inept 
mechanic, the clerk who cannot type. Inability 
to perform the duties of a grade or MOS is only 
one form of inefficiency. Besides inability to 
perform military duties satisfactorily, other 
examples of inefficiency include: failure to 
maintain acceptable standards of physical con-
ditioning; financial mismanagement as evi-
denced by failure to support dependents or to 
satisfy long-standing personal indebtedness; 
and violations of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ). This latter category is of par- · 
ticular concern because it appears commanders 
rarely consider reductions for inefficiency when 
they decide that court-martial charges are ap-
propriate. Apparently there is a myth that re-
duction action at such a time is double jeopardy 
or that it would somehow be unfair. Such ad-
ministrative actions prior to trial are perfectly 
legal. 
Servicemembers who are suspected of crimi-
nal offenses are subject to nonjudicial punish-
ment (Article 15, UCMJ), court-martial action, 
or civilian prosecution. Because reduction for 
inefficiency is an administrative procedure 
(para 7-64b, AR 600-200, Enlisted Personnel 
Management System), it is not to be used in 
lieu of Article 15 or for a single act of miscon-
duct where performance of duty is otherwise 
satisfactory. However, conduct warranting ac-
tion under the UCMJ also warrants a com-
mander's immediate consideration of whether 
the member's total performance justifies reten-
tion in grade. A commander, knowing the per-
tinent facts of an incident and the prior record 
of the individual, may decide that a serv-
icemember should not be retained in his or her 
current grade regardless of whether the soldier 
in question may later be. proven a criminal 
(which involves more stringent rules of evi-
dence and a different standard of proof). If the 
commander decides to act under AR 600-200, 
he may do so without regard to later action 
taken, or not taken, under the UCMJ. 
Proper use of reduction authority not only 
ensures the ranks are filled with qualified per-
sonnel but also instills greater respect for and 
pride among those who conscientiously live up 
to their responsibilities. Subordinate com-
manders should be informed that they should 
consider administrative reduction in addition to 
other possible actions for misconduct. 
